有没有神奇武器扭转战局的例子?
正文翻译
There seems to be a repeating topos in history, where powers on the loosing side of a war try to turn its tide by inventing new, secret and/or super weapons. The misguided hope seems to be that these new wonder weapons will be enough to totally surprise their enemies, dominate the battlefield and/or shock the enemy into submission – and thus bring by victory in short order.
历史似乎有个重复的主题，战争失败的一方试图通过秘密发明新的、超级武器来扭转局势。失败方错误地认为这些新式神奇武器完全可以打敌人一个措手不及、能主导战场和震慑敌人，让敌人不得不投降，从而在短时间内取得胜利。
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There seems to be a repeating topos in history, where powers on the loosing side of a war try to turn its tide by inventing new, secret and/or super weapons. The misguided hope seems to be that these new wonder weapons will be enough to totally surprise their enemies, dominate the battlefield and/or shock the enemy into submission – and thus bring by victory in short order.历史似乎有个重复的主题，战争失败的一方试图通过秘密发明新的、超级武器来扭转局势。失败方错误地认为这些新式神奇武器完全可以打敌人一个措手不及、能主导战场和震慑敌人，让敌人不得不投降，从而在短时间内取得胜利。
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The examples I know of, however, all failed rather miserably. To my (unscholarly) eye a plausible reason for this appears to be because wars seem to be, more often than not, won through logistics and economics – and powers on the loosing end of a conflict seem to be operating on already stretched resource/logistics budgets, and will therefore be doubly taxed by the R&D efforts for new "super weapons", even given that those weapons would actually prove effective in the field.
然而，我知道例子的结局都是悲惨的失败。在我这个无知的人看来，一个合理的原因似乎是因为战争取胜往往受物流和经济影响，冲突失败方的资源操作、物流预算似乎已经不堪重负,如果这个时候再去研发新式超级武器，即便最后证明这些武器在战场上起到了作用，也相当于多花了一倍的钱。
然而，我知道例子的结局都是悲惨的失败。在我这个无知的人看来，一个合理的原因似乎是因为战争取胜往往受物流和经济影响，冲突失败方的资源操作、物流预算似乎已经不堪重负,如果这个时候再去研发新式超级武器，即便最后证明这些武器在战场上起到了作用，也相当于多花了一倍的钱。
Some examples that were (quite) unsuccessful:
下面是一些(相当)不成功的例子:
下面是一些(相当)不成功的例子:
Japan building submarine aircraft carriers towards the end of WW2.
Hitlers ambitious (or rather: illusionary) Wunderwaffen programs, such as the Maus Panzer, Landkreuzer Ratte and many many more…
日本在二战末期建造了潜艇、航空母舰。
希特勒野心勃勃的(或者更确切地说:幻想的) 奇迹武器，比如重战车计划、超重型坦克给还有很多很多……
Hitlers ambitious (or rather: illusionary) Wunderwaffen programs, such as the Maus Panzer, Landkreuzer Ratte and many many more…
日本在二战末期建造了潜艇、航空母舰。
希特勒野心勃勃的(或者更确切地说:幻想的) 奇迹武器，比如重战车计划、超重型坦克给还有很多很多……
评论翻译
The Paris Guns from WW1
There seem to be examples where the side already winning the war was able to expedite its course by bringing new weapons to the table: a prominent example being the Manhattan Project which culminated in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thus essentially ending the war with Japan. But I would disregard this: since the US were already in a clearly favourable position to win the war the atomic bomb was hardly a complete game changer.
Are there examples of wonder weapons which were actually able to turn the tide of a war for the loosing side?
似乎有一些例子表明，已经赢得战争的一方能够通过将新武器摆上谈判桌来加快战争进程:一个突出的例子是曼哈顿计划，该计划以轰炸广岛和长崎而告终，从而根本上结束了对日战争。不过我对此不是很赞同:由于美国在这场战争中已经处于明显有利的地位，因此原子弹很难完全改变游戏规则。
有没有快要输掉战争的一方靠着奇迹武器扭转战争潮流的例子？
There seem to be examples where the side already winning the war was able to expedite its course by bringing new weapons to the table: a prominent example being the Manhattan Project which culminated in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thus essentially ending the war with Japan. But I would disregard this: since the US were already in a clearly favourable position to win the war the atomic bomb was hardly a complete game changer.
Are there examples of wonder weapons which were actually able to turn the tide of a war for the loosing side?
似乎有一些例子表明，已经赢得战争的一方能够通过将新武器摆上谈判桌来加快战争进程:一个突出的例子是曼哈顿计划，该计划以轰炸广岛和长崎而告终，从而根本上结束了对日战争。不过我对此不是很赞同:由于美国在这场战争中已经处于明显有利的地位，因此原子弹很难完全改变游戏规则。
有没有快要输掉战争的一方靠着奇迹武器扭转战争潮流的例子？
Jan
Greek fire seems to have been quite important for the Eastern Romans on several occasions.
东罗马人在很多场合都使用了希腊火，对他们来说希腊火似乎非常重要。
Greek fire seems to have been quite important for the Eastern Romans on several occasions.
东罗马人在很多场合都使用了希腊火，对他们来说希腊火似乎非常重要。
Luiz
The Korean Turtle ship and wins against Japan while very outnumbered. But you could argue that the Turtle ships were a resurrected idea, not fully new, and that the wins were due to better tactics, not just the weapons themselves. There is a movie called "Admiral" imdb.com/title/tt3541262 about the most famous and against the odds victory .
朝鲜龟船在数量上远远超过日本的情况下取得了胜利。但是你可以争辩说海龟船是之前武器的复兴，不是全新武器，朝鲜胜利是由于更好的战术，而不仅仅是武器本身。有一部电影叫《鸣梁海战》，就介绍了这场著名的艰难胜利。
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The Korean Turtle ship and wins against Japan while very outnumbered. But you could argue that the Turtle ships were a resurrected idea, not fully new, and that the wins were due to better tactics, not just the weapons themselves. There is a movie called "Admiral" imdb.com/title/tt3541262 about the most famous and against the odds victory .
朝鲜龟船在数量上远远超过日本的情况下取得了胜利。但是你可以争辩说海龟船是之前武器的复兴，不是全新武器，朝鲜胜利是由于更好的战术，而不仅仅是武器本身。有一部电影叫《鸣梁海战》，就介绍了这场著名的艰难胜利。
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releseabe Sep 25 at 0:45
In Rhodes' The Making of the Atomic Bomb a general says to scientists pitching the bomb idea that wars are won due to morale and new weapons don't make that much difference or something to that effect. Worth reading this book and that discussion.
理查德 罗兹的《原子弹出世记》一书中，一位将军对那些鼓吹炸弹理论的科学家说，战争的胜利取决于士兵的士气，新武器并不能带来多大变化，也不会有多大影响。这本书和那个讨论都值得一读。
In Rhodes' The Making of the Atomic Bomb a general says to scientists pitching the bomb idea that wars are won due to morale and new weapons don't make that much difference or something to that effect. Worth reading this book and that discussion.
理查德 罗兹的《原子弹出世记》一书中，一位将军对那些鼓吹炸弹理论的科学家说，战争的胜利取决于士兵的士气，新武器并不能带来多大变化，也不会有多大影响。这本书和那个讨论都值得一读。
DevSolar Sep 25 at 8:00
Phalanx, Trireme, Chariot, Longbow, Trebuchet, Musket / Firearms / Artillery, shaped charges, paratroopers, mobile tank units / Blitzkrieg, radar, proximity fuses, Turing bomb, A-bomb, ... -- if a weapon is so effective, it turns into the new standard afterwards. The "wonder" is only attached to the "failed attempts", because they remain a curiosity sidenote of history.
方阵、三层划桨战船、二轮战车、长弓、抛石机、毛瑟枪、火器、大炮、锥孔装药、伞兵、机动坦克、闪电战、雷达、近炸引信、图灵炸弹、原子弹……如果武器如此有效，以后就会变成新的标准。“奇迹”都来自“失败的尝试”，因为因为失败的尝试仍然是历史的注脚。
Phalanx, Trireme, Chariot, Longbow, Trebuchet, Musket / Firearms / Artillery, shaped charges, paratroopers, mobile tank units / Blitzkrieg, radar, proximity fuses, Turing bomb, A-bomb, ... -- if a weapon is so effective, it turns into the new standard afterwards. The "wonder" is only attached to the "failed attempts", because they remain a curiosity sidenote of history.
方阵、三层划桨战船、二轮战车、长弓、抛石机、毛瑟枪、火器、大炮、锥孔装药、伞兵、机动坦克、闪电战、雷达、近炸引信、图灵炸弹、原子弹……如果武器如此有效，以后就会变成新的标准。“奇迹”都来自“失败的尝试”，因为因为失败的尝试仍然是历史的注脚。
Releseabe
I think radar made a huge difference to the valiant English who were fighting the nazis single handedly. With radar they could scramble planes; without it, the only way would have been to keep planes always in the air in multiple locations and of course they lacked men, machines and fuel for this. So this was a practical "weapon" (actually originally intended to be an offensive death ray) that made a huge difference.
The computing machinery designed at Bletchley Park could be considered a wonder weapon and it had a bigger effect perhaps than anything else besides radar.
我觉得，对于单独与纳粹德国作战的英勇英国人来说，雷达起到了巨大的作用。有了雷达，他们的飞机可以紧急起飞;没有雷达，唯一的办法只能是让飞机一致在空中各个地方飞着，如果这样的话英国可能会缺乏人员、机器和燃料。所以这是一种实用的“武器”(实际上最初打算是一种进攻性的死亡射线)，而且起到了巨大的作用。
布莱切利公园设计的计算机可以被看作是神奇的武器，这种武器的影响可能比雷达更大。
I think radar made a huge difference to the valiant English who were fighting the nazis single handedly. With radar they could scramble planes; without it, the only way would have been to keep planes always in the air in multiple locations and of course they lacked men, machines and fuel for this. So this was a practical "weapon" (actually originally intended to be an offensive death ray) that made a huge difference.
The computing machinery designed at Bletchley Park could be considered a wonder weapon and it had a bigger effect perhaps than anything else besides radar.
我觉得，对于单独与纳粹德国作战的英勇英国人来说，雷达起到了巨大的作用。有了雷达，他们的飞机可以紧急起飞;没有雷达，唯一的办法只能是让飞机一致在空中各个地方飞着，如果这样的话英国可能会缺乏人员、机器和燃料。所以这是一种实用的“武器”(实际上最初打算是一种进攻性的死亡射线)，而且起到了巨大的作用。
布莱切利公园设计的计算机可以被看作是神奇的武器，这种武器的影响可能比雷达更大。
Schwern
Radar was well known to all the powers in WW2. What could be argued to be a wonder weapon is its miniaturization and improved accuracy which to allowed it to be put on small warships, aircraft, and even shells. This was a large advantage to US night fighting and air defense in the Pacific, and in the Battle of the Atlantic hunting U-Boats, and greatly improved the effect of Allied artillery. During the Battle of Britain I would argue the Dowding system was more decisive than their radar.
雷达在二战中为所有大国所熟知。被认为是一种神奇武器的是它的小型化和精度的提高，这使得它可以被安装在小型战舰、飞机甚至炮弹上。这对美国在太平洋的夜战和防空，以及在大西洋的u型潜艇搜寻战中都是一个巨大的优势，并且大大提高了盟军炮兵的效果。在不列颠战役中，我认为探测系统比雷达更具决定性。
Radar was well known to all the powers in WW2. What could be argued to be a wonder weapon is its miniaturization and improved accuracy which to allowed it to be put on small warships, aircraft, and even shells. This was a large advantage to US night fighting and air defense in the Pacific, and in the Battle of the Atlantic hunting U-Boats, and greatly improved the effect of Allied artillery. During the Battle of Britain I would argue the Dowding system was more decisive than their radar.
雷达在二战中为所有大国所熟知。被认为是一种神奇武器的是它的小型化和精度的提高，这使得它可以被安装在小型战舰、飞机甚至炮弹上。这对美国在太平洋的夜战和防空，以及在大西洋的u型潜艇搜寻战中都是一个巨大的优势，并且大大提高了盟军炮兵的效果。在不列颠战役中，我认为探测系统比雷达更具决定性。
Schwern
The conclusion I came to when writing up my answer regarding the Gulf War is that "wonder weapons" on their own don't win wars, and if used that way they are ineffective. Instead, they must be used as force multipliers for conventional forces. Radar was a force multiplier for an excellent air defense system, but without the Dowding system radar would have been ineffective. The Germans squandered all sorts of wonder weapons because they were used alone as war winning wonder weapons, not integrated force-multipliers.
在写下海湾战争的答案，我得出的结论是，“神奇武器”本身并不能赢得战争，如果那样使用那就没有任何效果。相反，神奇武器必须被用作常规部队的实力加倍器。雷达是优秀的防空系统的实力加倍器，但没有“道丁系统”，雷达就没有什么用。德国人浪费了各种各样的神奇武器，因为德国人只把这些武器用作战争胜利的神奇武器，而不是综合的实力加倍器。
The conclusion I came to when writing up my answer regarding the Gulf War is that "wonder weapons" on their own don't win wars, and if used that way they are ineffective. Instead, they must be used as force multipliers for conventional forces. Radar was a force multiplier for an excellent air defense system, but without the Dowding system radar would have been ineffective. The Germans squandered all sorts of wonder weapons because they were used alone as war winning wonder weapons, not integrated force-multipliers.
在写下海湾战争的答案，我得出的结论是，“神奇武器”本身并不能赢得战争，如果那样使用那就没有任何效果。相反，神奇武器必须被用作常规部队的实力加倍器。雷达是优秀的防空系统的实力加倍器，但没有“道丁系统”，雷达就没有什么用。德国人浪费了各种各样的神奇武器，因为德国人只把这些武器用作战争胜利的神奇武器，而不是综合的实力加倍器。
ItalianPhilosophers4Monica
@Schwern hmmm, the Germans failed to even seriously target the radars during the Battle of Britain. The tech might have been known, its use potential and doctrine wasn't clear. IIRC they did at some point knock one radar out (the masts were huge) took out a chunk of the English grid and then didn't follow up or anything. I like this answer, except that SeaLion would have been very hard to pull off even if the Battle of Britain had been lost in the air.
嗯，在不列颠战役中，德军甚至没有认真地瞄准雷达。这项技术可能已经为人所知，可是雷达的使用潜力和原理尚不清楚。如果我没记错，在某种程度上来说，德国人确认摧毁了一座雷达（雷达的天线杆比较大），还拿出了一大块英军的电网，不过后续没有追踪或做任何事情。我喜欢这个答案，不过就算是英国人在不列颠空战中失利，德国人的海狮计划也很难取胜。
@Schwern hmmm, the Germans failed to even seriously target the radars during the Battle of Britain. The tech might have been known, its use potential and doctrine wasn't clear. IIRC they did at some point knock one radar out (the masts were huge) took out a chunk of the English grid and then didn't follow up or anything. I like this answer, except that SeaLion would have been very hard to pull off even if the Battle of Britain had been lost in the air.
嗯，在不列颠战役中，德军甚至没有认真地瞄准雷达。这项技术可能已经为人所知，可是雷达的使用潜力和原理尚不清楚。如果我没记错，在某种程度上来说，德国人确认摧毁了一座雷达（雷达的天线杆比较大），还拿出了一大块英军的电网，不过后续没有追踪或做任何事情。我喜欢这个答案，不过就算是英国人在不列颠空战中失利，德国人的海狮计划也很难取胜。
Schwern
@ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Military Aviation History has an analysis of "Just Destroy The Radar" and concludes the Germans were well aware of Chain Home, but the technical information was not turned into operational information. They were not aware of the Dowding System. Knocking out radar stations would have required a large effort, a conventional bomb blast won't affect a wire and cable tower without a difficult direct hit, drawing resources away from other efforts.
《军事航空史》对“摧毁雷达”进行了分析，得出的结论是，德国人对海岸警戒雷达很清楚，但技术信息没有转化为作战信息。他们不知道道丁系统。摧毁雷达站需要很大精力，除非受到严重的直接打击，负责常规炸弹爆炸不会影响雷达的电线和电缆塔，这会占用其他作战资源。
@ItalianPhilosophers4Monica Military Aviation History has an analysis of "Just Destroy The Radar" and concludes the Germans were well aware of Chain Home, but the technical information was not turned into operational information. They were not aware of the Dowding System. Knocking out radar stations would have required a large effort, a conventional bomb blast won't affect a wire and cable tower without a difficult direct hit, drawing resources away from other efforts.
《军事航空史》对“摧毁雷达”进行了分析，得出的结论是，德国人对海岸警戒雷达很清楚，但技术信息没有转化为作战信息。他们不知道道丁系统。摧毁雷达站需要很大精力，除非受到严重的直接打击，负责常规炸弹爆炸不会影响雷达的电线和电缆塔，这会占用其他作战资源。
Jos
What exactly is a miracle weapon? My definition would be: something that all of a sudden changes the outcome of a conflict and decides a war.
Hannibal used clay pots filled with snakes to be thrown on the decks of enemy vessels. That's not a miracle weapon because it decided the outcome of a battle, but not the war.
神奇武器到底是什么?我的定义是:突然改变冲突结果并决定战争结果的东西。
汉尼拔把装满蛇的陶罐扔到敌船的甲板上。那不是神奇武器，因为这只决定了一场战斗的结果，而不是整场战争的结果。
What exactly is a miracle weapon? My definition would be: something that all of a sudden changes the outcome of a conflict and decides a war.
Hannibal used clay pots filled with snakes to be thrown on the decks of enemy vessels. That's not a miracle weapon because it decided the outcome of a battle, but not the war.
神奇武器到底是什么?我的定义是:突然改变冲突结果并决定战争结果的东西。
汉尼拔把装满蛇的陶罐扔到敌船的甲板上。那不是神奇武器，因为这只决定了一场战斗的结果，而不是整场战争的结果。
I see artillery not as a miracle weapon per se, because the technology was well known at the time.
我认为火炮本身并不是神奇武器，因为这种技术在当时众所周知。
我认为火炮本身并不是神奇武器，因为这种技术在当时众所周知。
Today a 155 mm howitzer is pretty much standard. Imagine an army coming up with 400 mm howitzers with triple the range and four times faster to reload. That could be a miracle weapon. Could, if it decided the outcome of a war, not a battle.
今天，155毫米榴弹炮属于标准配置。想象一支配有射程是原来三倍400毫米榴弹炮，装填速度是原来的四倍的部队。如果这决定了一场战争，而不是一场战役的胜利，那么这就是神奇武器。
今天，155毫米榴弹炮属于标准配置。想象一支配有射程是原来三倍400毫米榴弹炮，装填速度是原来的四倍的部队。如果这决定了一场战争，而不是一场战役的胜利，那么这就是神奇武器。
The artillery used in my example was such a miracle weapon. It was several times bigger than any existing piece of artillery and with a much longer range. It required new casting techniques that were unknown before. And it did decide the outcome of the war: the fall of Constantinopel and with it the Byzantine Empire. (Though it lingered on in a remote corner of Greece for a while.)
我举例的火炮就是神奇武器。因为我说的火炮比现有的任何火炮都要大好几倍，射程也远得多。铸造这种火炮需要之前不知道的新铸造技术。而且这种火炮能决定战争走向：君士坦丁宝的覆灭以及拜占庭帝国的覆灭。(尽管在希腊的偏远角落徘徊了一段时间。)
我举例的火炮就是神奇武器。因为我说的火炮比现有的任何火炮都要大好几倍，射程也远得多。铸造这种火炮需要之前不知道的新铸造技术。而且这种火炮能决定战争走向：君士坦丁宝的覆灭以及拜占庭帝国的覆灭。(尽管在希腊的偏远角落徘徊了一段时间。)
1- Greek Fire The Byzantines were not doing well against muslim invaders. Greek fire changed that almost overnight.
2- Artillery Exactly the reverse happened to the Byzantine Empire when Ottoman besiegers used the - then - biggest guns in the world to batter the walls.
1. 希腊火：拜占庭人在对抗穆斯林入侵时表现不佳。有了希腊之火之后，几乎一夜之间就改变了局势。
2. 火炮：拜占庭帝国的情况正好相反，奥斯曼帝国的围攻者使用了当时世界上最大的大炮摧毁了拜占庭帝国的城墙。
2- Artillery Exactly the reverse happened to the Byzantine Empire when Ottoman besiegers used the - then - biggest guns in the world to batter the walls.
1. 希腊火：拜占庭人在对抗穆斯林入侵时表现不佳。有了希腊之火之后，几乎一夜之间就改变了局势。
2. 火炮：拜占庭帝国的情况正好相反，奥斯曼帝国的围攻者使用了当时世界上最大的大炮摧毁了拜占庭帝国的城墙。
I did read that in both cases the inventors offered their invention first to the opposition, who declined to buy it. Then they went to the other party, who were more than happy to shell out the money and won the war. However, I can't find it back.
这两种情况我都读到过，发明者先是把自己的发明提供给打仗的一方，如果其中一方拒绝购买。这些发明者就把自己的发明推荐给另一方，谁愿意利索地付钱，谁就能赢得战争。不过我不知道在哪看的了。
这两种情况我都读到过，发明者先是把自己的发明提供给打仗的一方，如果其中一方拒绝购买。这些发明者就把自己的发明推荐给另一方，谁愿意利索地付钱，谁就能赢得战争。不过我不知道在哪看的了。
Italian Philosophers 4 Monica
The Roman boarding device known as the Corvus, for Punic War #1.
第一次布匿战争，罗马的登岸工具被称为乌鸦吊桥。
The Roman boarding device known as the Corvus, for Punic War #1.
第一次布匿战争，罗马的登岸工具被称为乌鸦吊桥。
Going into this war, Rome was a land power, Carthage a sea power. Despite that, Rome won several big naval battles by being better at boarding enemy ships. So, really what you have is that Rome should have lost, but then won.
第一次布匿战争中，罗马是陆地强国，而迦太基是海上强国。尽管如此，罗马在几场大型海战中都是靠登船取胜的。所以，罗马可是说是反败为胜。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
第一次布匿战争中，罗马是陆地强国，而迦太基是海上强国。尽管如此，罗马在几场大型海战中都是靠登船取胜的。所以，罗马可是说是反败为胜。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
In the 3rd century BCE, Rome was not a naval power, and had little experience in sea combat. Before the First Punic War began in 264 BCE, the Roman Republic had not campaigned outside the Italian Peninsula. The Republic's military strength was in land-based warfare, and its main assets were the discipline and courage of the Roman soldiers. The boarding bridge allowed the Romans to use their infantry advantage at sea, therefore helping to overcome the Carthaginians' superior naval experience and skills. The Romans' application of boarding tactics worked; they won several battles, most notably those of Mylae, Sulci, Tyndaris, and Ecnomus.
公元前3世纪，罗马还不是海军强国，也没有多少海战经验。公元前264年第一次布匿战争开始之前，罗马共和国没有在意大利半岛之外进行过战争。罗马共和国军事力量的根基是陆地战争，罗马军队的主要实力在士兵的纪律性和勇气。乌鸦吊桥让罗马人得以在海上发挥步兵优势，从而帮助他们战胜了拥有卓越海军经验和技能的迦太基人。罗马人的登船战术发挥作用了;他们赢得了几场战役，最著名的是在迈利(Mylae)战役、索拉席之役、丁达之役以及埃克诺穆斯海峡沟渠之战。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
公元前3世纪，罗马还不是海军强国，也没有多少海战经验。公元前264年第一次布匿战争开始之前，罗马共和国没有在意大利半岛之外进行过战争。罗马共和国军事力量的根基是陆地战争，罗马军队的主要实力在士兵的纪律性和勇气。乌鸦吊桥让罗马人得以在海上发挥步兵优势，从而帮助他们战胜了拥有卓越海军经验和技能的迦太基人。罗马人的登船战术发挥作用了;他们赢得了几场战役，最著名的是在迈利(Mylae)战役、索拉席之役、丁达之役以及埃克诺穆斯海峡沟渠之战。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
Apparently the corvus fell into disuse soon afterwards, possibly because it destabilized Roman ships. But at first use it transformed what should have been easy Carthaginian naval wins into a series of losses and laid the ground for Rome's win of the 1st Punic War.
很明显，乌鸦吊桥后来很快就被废弃了，可能是因为破坏了罗马船只的稳定。但一开始使用乌鸦吊桥，迦太基海军本应轻松取胜的战争却遭受了一系列损失，为罗马第一次布匿战争的胜利奠定了基础。
很明显，乌鸦吊桥后来很快就被废弃了，可能是因为破坏了罗马船只的稳定。但一开始使用乌鸦吊桥，迦太基海军本应轻松取胜的战争却遭受了一系列损失，为罗马第一次布匿战争的胜利奠定了基础。
Lars Bosteen
The Romans didn't use the corvus until after they had lost the Battle of the Lipari Islands. True, losing a single battle does not necessarily mean you are losing the war, but I think this is an interesting example (if not wholly following what the OP stipulated).
罗马人是在利伯里群岛战役失败后才使用的乌鸦吊桥。诚然，输掉一场战役并不一定意味着你输掉了整个战争，但我认为这是一个有趣的例子(如果不是完全遵循题主的规定)。
The Romans didn't use the corvus until after they had lost the Battle of the Lipari Islands. True, losing a single battle does not necessarily mean you are losing the war, but I think this is an interesting example (if not wholly following what the OP stipulated).
罗马人是在利伯里群岛战役失败后才使用的乌鸦吊桥。诚然，输掉一场战役并不一定意味着你输掉了整个战争，但我认为这是一个有趣的例子(如果不是完全遵循题主的规定)。
Schwern
...these new wonder weapons will be enough to totally surprise their enemies, dominate the battlefield and/or shock the enemy into submission – and thus bring by victory in short order.
这些新神奇武器足以打敌人一个措手不及，掌控战场和震慑敌人-从而在短时间内带来胜利。
...these new wonder weapons will be enough to totally surprise their enemies, dominate the battlefield and/or shock the enemy into submission – and thus bring by victory in short order.
这些新神奇武器足以打敌人一个措手不及，掌控战场和震慑敌人-从而在短时间内带来胜利。
"Wonder weapons" turned the First Gulf War from a meat-grinder into a walk-over. It was the culmination of decades of technological advancement in warfare which had yet to be tested in combat. Strategic use of stealth aircraft, smart weapons, cruise missiles, and night attack allowed the Allies to decapitate the Iraqi command and control system. And GPS allowed the Allies armies to bypass the heaviest ground defenses.
“神奇武器”将第一次海湾战争从绞肉机变成了一场无足轻重的战争。这是几十年来战争技术进步的顶点，而这些技术进步还有待于在战斗中检验。对隐形飞机、智能武器、巡航导弹和夜间攻击的战略使用，使盟军能够彻底摧毁伊拉克的指挥控制系统。GPS让盟军绕过了最沉重的地面防御。
“神奇武器”将第一次海湾战争从绞肉机变成了一场无足轻重的战争。这是几十年来战争技术进步的顶点，而这些技术进步还有待于在战斗中检验。对隐形飞机、智能武器、巡航导弹和夜间攻击的战略使用，使盟军能够彻底摧毁伊拉克的指挥控制系统。GPS让盟军绕过了最沉重的地面防御。
Though the initial claims were overstated, the result was still impressive. I would argue the real value of a "wonder weapon" is not to win a war, but as an unexpected force multiplier for conventional forces.
尽管最初的说法有些夸张，但结果仍然令人印象深刻。我认为“神奇武器”的真正价值不是赢得一场战争，而是令人意想不到的常规力量的倍增器。
尽管最初的说法有些夸张，但结果仍然令人印象深刻。我认为“神奇武器”的真正价值不是赢得一场战争，而是令人意想不到的常规力量的倍增器。
Given the historical outcome of the First Gulf War, it's easy to forget it was expected to be a meat-grinder. While Iraq had no hope of winning militarily, they could politically sustain great casualties while the Allies could not. It was possible Iraq could bog the Allies down and inflict a politically untenable number of casualties and force a negotiated peace.
考虑到第一次海湾战争的结果，人们很容易忘记海湾战争曾被认为是绞肉机。虽然伊拉克没有希望在军事上取胜，但他们可以在政治上承受巨大的伤亡，而联盟军队则不能。伊拉克有可能使联盟军队陷入困境，在政治上带来难以维持的伤亡人数，并迫使联盟军队通过谈判达成和平。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
考虑到第一次海湾战争的结果，人们很容易忘记海湾战争曾被认为是绞肉机。虽然伊拉克没有希望在军事上取胜，但他们可以在政治上承受巨大的伤亡，而联盟军队则不能。伊拉克有可能使联盟军队陷入困境，在政治上带来难以维持的伤亡人数，并迫使联盟军队通过谈判达成和平。
原创翻译：龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.cn 转载请注明出处
The Allies faced a modern, centralized air defense system, and a large, dug-in, battle-hardened army using modern Soviet equipment. Allied equipment and organization was largely untested. Yet the land-battle took just four days with scant Allied casualties.
联盟军队面对的是现代化的中央防空系统，以及一支使用现代苏联装备、久经沙场的庞大军队。盟军的装备和组织大多未经检验。然而，这场陆地战斗只持续了四天，联盟军队伤亡很少。
联盟军队面对的是现代化的中央防空系统，以及一支使用现代苏联装备、久经沙场的庞大军队。盟军的装备和组织大多未经检验。然而，这场陆地战斗只持续了四天，联盟军队伤亡很少。
The F-117 stealth attack aircraft, helped by strategic destruction of key radar facilities and jamming of others, allowed the Allies to penetrate into the heart of Iraq's centralized command system unscathed. The F-117 was not the sleek, high performance stealth aircraft we know today; it sacrificed everything to make its stealth work. Precision guided munitions allowed these few small, low performance aircraft to decapitate Iraq's command and control system in the heart of Baghdad on the first night; a feat otherwise not impossible, but would have taken unacceptable casualties.
驾驶F-117隐形攻击机借助雷达设施的战略摧毁，并对其他设施进行干扰的情况下，联盟军可以毫发无损地侵入伊拉克中央指挥系统的核心。F-117并不是我们今天所熟知的井然有序、高性能的隐形飞机;这款战斗机为了隐形，几乎牺牲了所有其他功能。精确制导弹药使这款小型、性能低下的飞机在第一天晚上就摧毁了位于巴格达中心的伊拉克指挥和控制系统;这不是不可能的壮举，但是却给伊拉克带来了无法接受的伤亡。
驾驶F-117隐形攻击机借助雷达设施的战略摧毁，并对其他设施进行干扰的情况下，联盟军可以毫发无损地侵入伊拉克中央指挥系统的核心。F-117并不是我们今天所熟知的井然有序、高性能的隐形飞机;这款战斗机为了隐形，几乎牺牲了所有其他功能。精确制导弹药使这款小型、性能低下的飞机在第一天晚上就摧毁了位于巴格达中心的伊拉克指挥和控制系统;这不是不可能的壮举，但是却给伊拉克带来了无法接受的伤亡。
The role and effectiveness of the F-117 during the Gulf War has been overstated. "Smart bombs" were not as accurate as intended. It could be detected on radar, but was difficult to target, thus requiring supplemental SEAD and electronic warfare escort. Conventional night attack aircraft did operate over Baghdad. Simultaneous strikes by air and sea launched cruise missiles added to the destruction and confusion. All this culminated into the early destruction or suppression of targets vital to running an army: government buildings, TV stations, airfields, presidential palaces, military installations, communication lines, supply bases, oil refineries, electric powerplants and factories.
F-117在海湾战争中的作用和效力被夸大了。“智能炸弹”没有预期的那么精确。可以被雷达探测，但是很难瞄准，因此需要对敌防空压制和电子战护航进行补充。常规的夜间战斗机确实在巴格达上空执行任务。空中和海上同时发射的巡航导弹给伊拉克造成了巨大破坏，造成混乱。所有这些都给军队行动至关重要的目标造成了前期破坏，或者压制:政府大楼、电视台、机场、总统府、军事设施、通信线路、供应基地、炼油厂、发电厂和工厂。
F-117在海湾战争中的作用和效力被夸大了。“智能炸弹”没有预期的那么精确。可以被雷达探测，但是很难瞄准，因此需要对敌防空压制和电子战护航进行补充。常规的夜间战斗机确实在巴格达上空执行任务。空中和海上同时发射的巡航导弹给伊拉克造成了巨大破坏，造成混乱。所有这些都给军队行动至关重要的目标造成了前期破坏，或者压制:政府大楼、电视台、机场、总统府、军事设施、通信线路、供应基地、炼油厂、发电厂和工厂。
The Allies did in a night what should have taken weeks of conventional rolling back of Iraq's air defenses, and wonder weapons were a key part of the plan. The Iraqis were prepared for a conventional battle and were unprepared for this, though they could have been better prepared for something like it. Their highly centralized military was left uncoordinated, overwhelmed, and sluggish to react. This left Iraq open to a month of air strikes with near impunity.
盟军在一夜之间完成了常规本应花费数周的时间打垮了伊拉克的防空系统，而神奇武器是该计划的关键部分。伊拉克人准备了一场常规的战斗，而这种战斗却打了他们一个措手不及，原本他们有机会对类似的战斗做更好的准备。高度集中的军队缺乏协调，不堪重负，反应迟缓。这使得伊拉克面临长达一个月的空袭却毫无还手之力。
盟军在一夜之间完成了常规本应花费数周的时间打垮了伊拉克的防空系统，而神奇武器是该计划的关键部分。伊拉克人准备了一场常规的战斗，而这种战斗却打了他们一个措手不及，原本他们有机会对类似的战斗做更好的准备。高度集中的军队缺乏协调，不堪重负，反应迟缓。这使得伊拉克面临长达一个月的空袭却毫无还手之力。
Even after a month of sitting in the desert being bombed, the Iraqi army still had to be dealt with. They had six months to dig in, and air power can only do so much. While the quality of the units on the front line was questionable, dug in they could potentially do a lot of damage, and they were backed up by mobile, experienced armored reserves.
即使在沙漠中被轰炸了一个月，可是联盟军队还是得直面伊拉克军队。他们有6个月的时间来掘壕固守，而空军做到这样也算是竭尽所能了。虽然前线部队的质量值得怀疑，掘壕固守可能会造成很大的破坏，而且他们有机动的、经验丰富的装甲后备部队作后盾。
即使在沙漠中被轰炸了一个月，可是联盟军队还是得直面伊拉克军队。他们有6个月的时间来掘壕固守，而空军做到这样也算是竭尽所能了。虽然前线部队的质量值得怀疑，掘壕固守可能会造成很大的破坏，而且他们有机动的、经验丰富的装甲后备部队作后盾。
Iraqi defenses along the Kuwait/Saudi border stretched from the sea to what the Iraqis considered impassible desert. With no roads or navigation aids, a conventional army could not operate in this area, so the Iraqis did not bother to defend it strongly. The Allies used their next wonder weapon: GPS. For the first time an army could know for sure where it was. This seems like a small thing, but a great many battles could have been won had their units not gotten lost.
伊拉克在科威特和沙特边境的防线从大海一直延伸到伊拉克人认为不可逾越的沙漠。由于没有道路和导航设备，传统的军队无法在这一地区作战，所以伊拉克人也不愿劳神费心去固守防线。盟军使用了另一个神奇武器:GPS。这是第一次军队可以确切地自己所处的位置。这看起来是一件小事，但是如果部队没有迷路的话，很多战役都可以打赢。
伊拉克在科威特和沙特边境的防线从大海一直延伸到伊拉克人认为不可逾越的沙漠。由于没有道路和导航设备，传统的军队无法在这一地区作战，所以伊拉克人也不愿劳神费心去固守防线。盟军使用了另一个神奇武器:GPS。这是第一次军队可以确切地自己所处的位置。这看起来是一件小事，但是如果部队没有迷路的话，很多战役都可以打赢。
While the Allies feigned an amphibious landing on the right to outflank the Iraqi defenses, they sent two corps sweeping left into the formerly impassible desert, now navigable thanks to GPS. Additional large raiding parties were sent in by helicopter to harass the retreating enemy, again aided by GPS. On the first night they had cut vital supply lines and surprised enemy units. The Iraqi Republican Guard contained the units of most concern to the Allies, and this "left-hook" allowed them to surprise them with a flank attack the Iraqis thought secure.
当联盟军假装在右侧进行两栖登陆以包抄伊军防线时，同时派出两支部队向左侧横扫过去无法进入的沙漠，由于全球定位系统(GPS)的存在，沙漠里也可以通行。另外的大型突袭部队被直升机派去骚扰撤退的敌人，同样也有GPS的辅助。第一天晚上，他们就切断了伊拉克重要的补给线，并对敌人进行了突袭。联盟军最关心的部队在伊拉克共和国卫队中，这种“左勾拳”让伊拉克人大吃一惊，在伊拉克人认为安全的侧翼进行突袭。
当联盟军假装在右侧进行两栖登陆以包抄伊军防线时，同时派出两支部队向左侧横扫过去无法进入的沙漠，由于全球定位系统(GPS)的存在，沙漠里也可以通行。另外的大型突袭部队被直升机派去骚扰撤退的敌人，同样也有GPS的辅助。第一天晚上，他们就切断了伊拉克重要的补给线，并对敌人进行了突袭。联盟军最关心的部队在伊拉克共和国卫队中，这种“左勾拳”让伊拉克人大吃一惊，在伊拉克人认为安全的侧翼进行突袭。
As with the air war, more conventional attacks also proved successful; more successful than was planned for. This became a problem for the Allies. The "left-hook" was supposed to surround and cut off the Iraqi army, but the conventional attacks from the south by the (not amphibious) US Marines and Joint forces were driving the Iraqi army north faster than anticipated allowing more to escape than they would have liked.
与空战一样，常规攻击也很成功;比原计划的还要成功。这成了联盟军的问题。“左钩拳”本应包围并切断伊拉克军队，但来自南方(非两栖)的美国海军陆战队和联合部队的常规进攻使伊拉克军队北迁的速度超出预期，这要导致更多人得以逃脱。
与空战一样，常规攻击也很成功;比原计划的还要成功。这成了联盟军的问题。“左钩拳”本应包围并切断伊拉克军队，但来自南方(非两栖)的美国海军陆战队和联合部队的常规进攻使伊拉克军队北迁的速度超出预期，这要导致更多人得以逃脱。
At the time, stealth, smart bombs, cruise missiles, and GPS were considered wonder weapons that won the Gulf War. Later analysis showed while they were very effective, they were not as effective as believed, and conventional attacks were more effective than anticipated. While wonder weapons did not win the Gulf War, they allowed the Allies to implement an unconventional plan which resulted in scant Allied casualties and a very decisive, quick victory.
当时，隐形、智能炸弹、巡航导弹和GPS被认为是赢得海湾战争的神奇武器。后来的分析表明，虽然这些武器大显身手，但效果却并不像人们认为的那样，而常规攻击比预期的更有效。虽然“奇迹武器”没有赢得海湾战争，但这些武器帮助联盟军实施了非常规的计划，导致盟军伤亡很少，但却取得了决定性的、迅速的胜利。
当时，隐形、智能炸弹、巡航导弹和GPS被认为是赢得海湾战争的神奇武器。后来的分析表明，虽然这些武器大显身手，但效果却并不像人们认为的那样，而常规攻击比预期的更有效。虽然“奇迹武器”没有赢得海湾战争，但这些武器帮助联盟军实施了非常规的计划，导致盟军伤亡很少，但却取得了决定性的、迅速的胜利。
And I think this is the story with wonder weapons through history. They rarely live up to their promises. They're often boondoggles which waste more resources. They require years and years of development to mature, and more to be understood how best to use them. Every wonder weapon of the Gulf War had been available for years: stealth in 1977, GPS in 1978 with precision munitions in WW2 and effective cruise missiles just after (no, don't count the wildly inaccurate V-1). Yet it took until 1991 for it to all come together, not as a war-winning weapon, but as a force-multiplier.
我想这就是历史上神奇武器的故事。他们很少兑现承诺，往往是浪费更多资源的无用之物。这些武器需要多年的发展才能成熟，需要更多时间才能明白如何最好地使用。即便是海湾战争中的神奇武器也已经存在好多年了：1977年就有了隐形战机，1978年就有了GPS，精密制导炮弹二战的时候就有了，之后就出现了巡航导弹(不，不包括非常不准确的V-1)。然而，直到1991年，才被整合到一起，不是作为决定战争胜负的武器，而是一种武力倍增的武器。
我想这就是历史上神奇武器的故事。他们很少兑现承诺，往往是浪费更多资源的无用之物。这些武器需要多年的发展才能成熟，需要更多时间才能明白如何最好地使用。即便是海湾战争中的神奇武器也已经存在好多年了：1977年就有了隐形战机，1978年就有了GPS，精密制导炮弹二战的时候就有了，之后就出现了巡航导弹(不，不包括非常不准确的V-1)。然而，直到1991年，才被整合到一起，不是作为决定战争胜负的武器，而是一种武力倍增的武器。
Pieter Geerkens
Greased buttocks at Salamis.
You laugh - but shouldn't. Many historians have long believed that the Greeks greased their buttocks as trireme rowers, allowing them much of the advantage of a modern rowing seat albeit at the expense of painful hemorrhoids later. This allowed the Greeks vessels to attain both a significantly faster ramming speed, and to faster battlefield deployment, ensuring victory.
萨拉米斯海战的时候给士兵们屁股上抹油。
你笑了，不要笑。长期以来，许多历史学家一直认为，希腊人为有三列桨座的战船的桨手屁股上抹油，这让他们在现代赛艇上占据了很大优势，尽管代价是疼痛的痔疮。这使得希腊的船只获得了明显更快的撞击速度和更快的战场部署，确保了胜利。
Greased buttocks at Salamis.
You laugh - but shouldn't. Many historians have long believed that the Greeks greased their buttocks as trireme rowers, allowing them much of the advantage of a modern rowing seat albeit at the expense of painful hemorrhoids later. This allowed the Greeks vessels to attain both a significantly faster ramming speed, and to faster battlefield deployment, ensuring victory.
萨拉米斯海战的时候给士兵们屁股上抹油。
你笑了，不要笑。长期以来，许多历史学家一直认为，希腊人为有三列桨座的战船的桨手屁股上抹油，这让他们在现代赛艇上占据了很大优势，尽管代价是疼痛的痔疮。这使得希腊的船只获得了明显更快的撞击速度和更快的战场部署，确保了胜利。
The Roman Legion
The organization, training, and weaponry of the Roman legion was widely imitated, but never with significant success. From the First Punic War to the early years of the Empire, the Roman ability to field legions that could defeat every other nation around the Mediterranean, even when outnumbered, was the rock upon which the SPQR was founded.
罗马军团的组织、训练和武器被广泛模仿，但从未取得重大成功。从第一次布匿战争到帝国早期，罗马人派遣的军团能够击败地中海周围的每一个国家，即使在兵力不足的情况下，这是罗马帝国建立的基石。
The organization, training, and weaponry of the Roman legion was widely imitated, but never with significant success. From the First Punic War to the early years of the Empire, the Roman ability to field legions that could defeat every other nation around the Mediterranean, even when outnumbered, was the rock upon which the SPQR was founded.
罗马军团的组织、训练和武器被广泛模仿，但从未取得重大成功。从第一次布匿战争到帝国早期，罗马人派遣的军团能够击败地中海周围的每一个国家，即使在兵力不足的情况下，这是罗马帝国建立的基石。
Jos
A Roman legion is not a wonder weapon. You of all people should know that.
罗马军团不是神奇的武器。你和你们的人都应该知道。
A Roman legion is not a wonder weapon. You of all people should know that.
罗马军团不是神奇的武器。你和你们的人都应该知道。
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